Syria in September - The "Perfect Mousetrap"

A note from MeanMesa:  The blog has been off the air for a few days while the hand was healing.  It's been a bit of a problem when typing more than two sentences has sent this old bird into a self-pity tizzy!  All that is over now.  Glad you're here!

 The Variety of the Dreams of Victory

Dreams of victory and justifications for fighting seem to run in paired sets.  As one of the historically most war like nations in the modern world, these dreams and justifications extracted from our recent domestic history are telling.  When attacked, we countered with a rueful propaganda effort in Afghanistan married to an oil war in Iraq.  

Drenched in both false shame and quite reasonable trepidation, the Saudis offered up a symbolic pittance as compensation for the grisly work of their countrymen.  Happily, for them, their "connections" diverted the retaliatory attacks and invasions onto two of their unfortunate neighbors.

The war making climate has now become so superficial that practically anything will serve to justify it.  Worse, those flimsy, meat handed justifications are simply too complex to actually metamorphose into workable results corresponding to any publicly held "dreams of victory."  These days find that already questionable old adjacency abandoned in favor of a variety of impulses disgustingly akin to simple religious vengeance, usually amounting to little more than a discarded rag soaked with testosterone and clotted blood driven by a public opinion campaign.

Rather than fighting because we were attacked or might be attacked, because our allies were attacked or in danger or even because our countrymen were attacked in some distant corner of the world, we fight for greed.  Further, it is not national greed which might -- conceivably -- be somewhat more coherent and understandable, it is the craven greed of oligarchs.

Those would be the oligarchs directly behind that line of war mongers eliciting the vast, raucous cheers during the debates of the Republican Primary.  MeanMesa is surprised that the stupefied teenagers in that audience had not already begun to bleed before the applause had ended.

Running along with the "becauses" which "justify" these monstrosities, we can see the chilling absence of any view of success.  There were no informed Americans who thought, even briefly, that an occupied medieval Afghanistan would become a modern democracy.  There were no informed Americans who thought that an Iraq with the autocracy removed would become "just like here."

Amazingly, there were no dreams of victory.  A few inches beyond the "catch phrases," "talking points" and false dichotomies only an empty hole remained where, in better times, victory might have held forth her dream. Down here on the ground we must still discuss the horrors with returning veterans, or even more perplexing, the reasons.  Down here on the ground we must still engage our neighbors in conversations about justifications and national accomplishments.

As one ascends to the atmospheric heights, the mindless realm of the oligarchs, such discourse falls silent.

We have managed to develop a national foreign policy which is absolutely devoid of discernible success. In fact, we -- as a national demographic of consolidated interests -- can't even agree on what such a success might be.

Thanks to the flat sighted reactionaries and their legions of the terrified, thinly disguised servants of those cursed by greed without limit, we are a paralyzed and demoralized remnant of what we were -- of what we must be again.  Relief is unlikely unless our reasonable national goals mature to a place commensurate with our actual strength.

By "relief" we mean a return to cogency.

The "October Surprise" - An American Tradition

There are plenty of accounts of various insurgent operations stepping up hostilities "in the spring" or "after the monsoon season."  We can immediately think of the on-going, annual conflicts in the Congo, in Aceh Banda or the wild western provinces of Pakistan.  We understand the alluring convenience of this scheduling pattern.

Around the world, fighting men without boots are making their way to combat zones in small, hidden places where the mud, heat and mosquitoes alone can be their greatest enemies.  These seasonal blood letting festivals are not the same as our domestic Easter or Thanksgiving celebrations.  They are scheduled to coincide with military and tactical advantages.

Here at home, however, it's just a bit less comprehensible. We have watched seven Republicans with the ambition of high office parrot out the war bait, one after another, to the deafening roar of responding cheers at their debates.  Instead of scheduling the proposed mayhem for better weather, here all such matters must be placed in the context and on the calendar of our the elections.

Systematically instilling a coarse, post literate fear in one crowd while inciting another to inflamed chest beating for the latest war making plan, these bellicose monstrosities from another era make the rounds, first for campaign contributions from those with ambitions of somehow profiting from such adventures and only later for the votes of those they have managed to frighten with hideous tales of the latest synthetic enemy. 

Finally, installed in power, they are taxed only for the maintenance of the respective opportunities of sustained terror and outrage.  Actual policy becomes nothing more than a potentially risky, flippant, unnecessarily complicating public opinion problem.

It's just as if actual blood did not exist.

It's just as if war were cheap.

War by Accident, Hubris or Oversight

We find ourselves in a state of economic collapse.  Although there are many "truisms" which can be uttered about war, one with exceptionally valid continuity is that it is expensive.  The more desperate it is, the more expensive it can become, in fact, the more expensive it will almost certainly become.

Our war with Afghanistan was blessed with only the most tenuous such validity.  It was a war for domestic consumption, and it was a war for unexamined vengeance.  There was essentially no prospect for enhanced national security by changing the warlords currently in power in Afghanistan.  Any actual incremental enhancements for national security would be both defensive and domestic ones.

The al Qaeda who attacked New York knew this.  Their bold strategy was entirely designed to avoid our military power.  They knew that they could pose no substantial threat to the United States beyond the furtive opportunity placed at their disposal.  The advantage which they carefully designed into their plot was the advantage of "pure asymmetry." 

They were protected from US military might because there would be neither traditional attack nor traditional retaliation.  Of course, the weakened US leadership, perhaps an unanticipated additional advantage, "took the bait."

Likewise, the oil war in Iraq could only be made valid in its own right by the proposition that it, too, was preventing an attack.  The argument began to literally fall apart the day it was first proposed, but the hypnotic attraction continued.  It didn't end there.

War.  War.  War.  War. (image source)

The most available and conveniently "hateable" adversary remained in the punching ball of Iran.  The country had already been pilloried by economic sanctions -- foreign policy which was actually effective -- by the time of the Republican debates, but the old penchant for violence hadn't moved an inch.

Plus, there was oil there.

Naturally, the reckless policy promises of those desperately transfixed with the necessity of "collecting" votes from an illiterate base ran immediately to a familiar theme.  Iranian "red meat" outrages could provide electoral cover for the hideous echo of the last Republican administration if only the base could be distracted long enough.

It's not a base which has a history of being difficult to distract.

Syria: The Stars Align for the "Perfect Mousetrap"

2012's "Perfect Mousetrap"

Granted, this post has "wandered" through some rather "big picture" issues of wars and war making.  That largess was precisely the intention.  Americans -- especially in election time and especially as we approach October -- should probably be interested in such a disturbingly sultry mix of both "big picture" and "contemporary specifics."

If one has paid even a passing attention to the commercial news or the content of this little blog from the desert, every one of the little white boxes in the "mousetrap" diagram above will mean something.  Should one or more of them mean nothing, MeanMesa strongly suggests that our noble visitor here tear that attention away from the political "frog festival" long enough to catch up with reality.

This is a potentially very bad collection of current events.

If you felt a few pangs of national uncertainty while we were careening into Iraq, a quite similar feeling should probably be emerging just about now.

The "trigger" seems to be -- at least for the moment -- centered on the question of whether or not the dictator of Syria will grow desperate enough to use his bunker full of poison gas in an attempt to hang on to his "legacy."  The current death toll in Syria now is in the range of around 20,000, mostly civilians.  The dictator's father is reported to have slaughtered 92,000 in his successful bid to "keep the garden."

The United States has very publicly revealed that our policy of not intervening militarily would have to be "rethought" if the gas were used.  The Europeans, Syria's neighbors -- especially Turkey -- would, most likely, be able to "rethink" their own positions even more rapidly.  The now openly fascist State of Israel is currently sipping tea and having wet dreams of its own about the same potentiality.

Presumably there are Russian military and diplomatic folks walking around all over the country.  More than "presumably," there are scores of Iranian nationals in make shift militias handling the dirty work in the dictator's door to door practices.  The orders for those  "door to door" visits are largely too savage to hand off to the dictator's Alaouite regulars.

This means that any substantial military intervention with the purpose of suppressing the use of the gas would be raining down on both Russian Federation military personnel and Iranian nationals.

It's been a while since the United States or NATO killed any Russian soldiers or diplomats.  Obliterating a few Iranians would probably not bother us too much, but the mullahs, already sitting on a wrecked economy [worse than ours], languishing under sanctions which have made civilian life awful and desperately watching the capstone of their tenuous terrorist arch to Hezbollah and Hamas slowly crumble would probably block the Gulf of Hormuz the next morning.

Further, MeanMesa assumes that the Russian defense fortifications at Tartus include either on-site nuclear capacity or hair trigger reinforcement from the Federation proper.  If the Iranians have a bomb of their own, which they might, it could also be insinuated into the defense alliance with Syria, a far more intimidating location for a nuclear test that anywhere in the Iranian desert. 

This level of escalation would not be offered as an indulgence to the dictator so much as evidence of the legitimacy for the Russians to rehabilitate the rather sorry record of lack of effectivity for Russian weapons systems which failed all through the countries of the Arab Spring.  The Iranians are more similar to the loud mouthed bully standing second in a line for a fist fight.

Both the Syrians and the Iranians are watching their dreams become chaotic junk yards, a state which makes them dangerous.

This rambling scenario could unfold a thousand different ways, but the "exciting" parts would easily include some or all of the nightmare being described here.

Sleep well.  Cavort through a moon lit comedy of the Republican Abortion Festival being inundated by an out of control hurricane in Tampa.

MeanMesa's compliments to the President.

For a couple other MeanMesa posts on Syria:
http://www.meanmesa.com/2012/06/syria-and-russia.html

http://www.meanmesa.com/2012/08/russia-china-syria-disgracing-great-and.html
and BBC, about Tartus:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18616191

Solidifying Syria

Looking Again for Syria-Libya Similarity

The American public didn't do too well in perceiving Libya.  In fact, we revealed a very nasty co-dependent streak.  We kept insisting that until we knew all about the "replacement regime," we just couldn't really help out much beyond bad mouthing Gaddafi.  Of course, as the overly righteous bunch that we are, we hardly broke a sweat with the dutiful "bad mouthing" assignment.

The premise was simple enough.  "We are so good that you can't possibly be good unless we like you."

Someone had to take the political risk of acting on ideals rather than craven, petrogarchic capitalism or our usual psychopathic fear of anything happening anywhere in the world which unfolds beyond our control.  Happily, our President took the risk.

However, it was in the "behind the scenes" action with Libya where the similarity to Syria can be found.  In order to survive the predictable onslaught by the domestic wing nuts who would blame him for a rainy day, a few details had to get kicked into order before even Obama could proceed.  These are precisely similar to the "loose ends" prevailing in Syria.

Rent-a-General, retired (image source)

The wing nut mantra was familiar.  No exit strategy.  Endless quagmire.  A third war in the Middle East.  The fear mongers barely had to even do so much as change the country name.

Someone to Answer the Phone

"Good afternoon.  This is the United States calling. With whom am I speaking?"

The usual talking heads immediately took up the challenge.  The preachers, coaches and retired generals marched out in lock step to tell Judy Woodruff about all the horrible things which were about to happen thanks to the incompetent and inexperienced professor in the Oval Office.  When the nightmarish military failure had been robustly described, the rant moved on to being fooled by none other than al Qaeda itself masquerading as Libyan freedom fighters.

Ben Ghazi didn't help much.  It seemed to take forever for the new government to reassure the West that they really were good guys, and all the while Gaddafi's tanks were warming up in the suburbs for some real meat grinding.  Ask anyone in Misrata.

Well, Ben Ghazi then -- and still, even now -- faced the traditional problem of a suddenly successful insurgency.  Unlike the other side where a heavy handed autocracy had long ago "homogenized" all disparate interests which could be useful and eliminated all those who were simply problems, the insurgents were composed of all sorts of elements united primarily by their consolidated determination to oust the last guys.

Typically, these various parts of an insurgency had spent little time imagining a unified state once their work was complete.  All the rough edges of centuries of tribal conflicts, religious animosity, wealth disparity and the rest were alive and well, set aside only for the task at hand.  This was the case in Libya, and this is the case in Syria.

Let's take a look at the various interest players in the conflict and the corresponding obstacles each one brings for solution.

The Syrians

Syria isn't quite as bad as Iraq in terms of pre-existing tribal divisions.  After all, there was a place called Syria even in the time of the Roman Empire, although this isn't to say that all the factions had ever particularly mastered to art of getting along.  The important point here is that each of these factions has its own priorities which must be satisfied in the end result.

Further, at some time through the long history of the place, most of these factions had attacked others, winning or losing, and creating very durable animosities. In the naive view of American Sunday School graduates and other policy Pollyannas, these difficulties should, reasonably, be simply swept away in favor of uniting under common cause.  The idea that what exists is an historical equivalent of Lutherans declaring open war on Presbyterians for a couple of decades completely escapes them.

The conclave of interested parties at the Syrian Opposition has worked to form what is loosely named the National Council outside the country.  With uncertain ties to the Free Syrian Army of defectors and regional insurgents around the country, the National Council is still being disrupted by factional priorities and questionable affiliation with the hundreds of thousands of Syrians still protesting on the streets.

Arab Spring Measure:  The Syrians are in their Arab Spring.

The Iranians

Syria has long been a "jewel" in the Islamic Republic's structure for regional dominance.  In the Sunni Shi'ite violence during the sectarian phase of US occupation in Iraq, the Iranian client state provided large numbers of "volunteers" to move across the common border to Iraq.  Currently, a large part of the Iranian military shipments to Syria cross the Eastern regions of Iraq against UN arms embargoes.

Syria supplies military equipment to both the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian [Gaza] Hamas against the UN arms embargoes in place for both destinations.  Syria, itself without much capacity for arms manufacturing, acts as a forwarding agent in these cases. 

Iran's worst nightmare is to become isolated.  Without access to its client states in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, Iran's capacity to create and sustain irreconcilable hostilities would be gravely reduced, leaving the Islamic Republic with only far more direct alternatives for expressing its influence in the region.  Tehran has no appetite for face to face conflict, although accomplishing its nuclear ambitions might mitigate some of this reluctance.

Arab Spring Measure:  Iranians are more than half way into their Arab Spring.

The Chinese

The catastrophic Security Council failure on Syrian issues was orchestrated by the Russians and the Chinese.  China's motive is slightly more passive that the Russian Federation's. Politically, China has little hegemonic interest in non-adjacent territories. The Chinese clearly valued Iranian oil supply and general "coziness" with Middle Eastern dictatorships who have survived the Arab Spring.  The PRC took a much more troubled glance at the Arab Spring than was presented in domestic US news because something similar could easily contest the State Council's total control inside China.

Arab Spring measure:  Rural areas, ethnically diverse areas and acquired provinces such as Tibet and the Uighurs are ready to begin their Arab Spring.

The Russians

The Russian Federation, however, has a much more direct interest in the survival of the Assad regime in Syria.  For one thing, Syria is saturated with Russian military products -- everything from the SAM's Syria has installed to prevent another Israeli air threat to Damascus to the smoke belching tanks which were unable to prevent the Israeli incursion into Golan.  If the Assad government, as a military client, were overthrown by street protests and the Free Syrian Army, global Russian arms sales would suffer.

However, Russia's stance with the Security Council VETO squarely places its traditions of revolutionary thought on the examining table for the world to see.  Russia might have appeared to be dealing with Syria, but it was concentrating on rebellious satellite countries where Arab Spring ideas were taking root. 

Arab Spring measure:  Many of the Federation's satellite states are ready to begin their Arab Spring.  Urban citizens inside Russia proper are getting closer, freaked about the heavy hand of the Putin oligarchs.

The Americans

This administration has set its own high bar in American policy for direct intervention.  The Libyan expedition was made legitimate by NATO participation, Security Council validation and Arab League approval.  This should not be surprising for a President with such a legalistic outlook in such matters.  It should also introduce the idea of a limit in the successful operation in the case of bin Laden.  Obama will do it, but Obama will feel the full burden of what he's doing while he does it, not the least of which derives from his own idea of legitimacy.

Obama's ideals will be in play if he decides to act on the Syrian pogrom, but those ideals will not be gaseous niceties about poorly defined ideas of liberty and progress.  Instead, they will be much more akin to the South Chicago street realities we saw in Pakistan.  Bold, decisive and direct.

Pentagon and Congressional policy wonks will predictably offer up the same types of heavy handed, Cold War solutions enumerated with naval blockades, ground troops in the tens of thousands, saturation bombing and the like.  The Pentagon will be looking for the next career opportunity, the Senate will be fiddling while the slaughter continues and the House will be consumed only with the happy, wet dream prospect of a military disaster for the Commander in Chief  months before the election.

Although reasonably compassionate folks might wish for some "middle of the road" path forward, those in the government aspiring to the status of "war making expert" will be locked, as usual, in their tragically unsuited, out dated set of false choices.  MeanMesa doesn't think that Obama sees it this way at all.

He has military technology which has never been available to past Presidents as they contemplated such questions.  He matches this technological advantage with a steady pragmatism and steely will -- both of which represent unsettling, essentially unknown attributes to the stodgy remnants of the Bush military establishment.

Arab Spring measure:  The Americans may be further into their Arab Spring than they are willing to admit.

The "technology?"

Drones

Of course there are a few "loose ends," but the military element is straight forward enough.  US drones are a perfect match for tanks firing randomly into civilian areas and convoys of troops and military supplies rolling along Syrian highways to their next killing field.  Coupled with no longer particularly secret satellite intelligence, the combination would castrate the dictatorship's and his terror squads' fire power advantage in days.

Low Hanging Fruit (image source)

We would then be at a very familiar foreign policy place.  The codependent side of American life would be screaming the predictable questions about "Who are we helping?" and probably moaning the now over worked, road weary lament about an exit strategy.

Libya has shown us that the "exit strategy" hobgobblin has no teeth if there has never been an "entrance."  As for Syria, flatten a few tanks actively engaged in the act of civilian murder, and level enough convoys so that the remainder start taking the threat seriously enough to begin keeping their heads down. 

The plan would be to "plow the road" for a bit, then let the insurgency run its course.  With the tanks and convoys more or less out of the picture, it wouldn't take long.

Loose Ends

We can address this issue best with a few questions.  Imagine an irate Russian Federation Foreign Ministry staffer in a closed meeting with Secretary of State, Hillary.

"You had no right to attack the Syrian government.  What makes you think you can just fly in there are start blowing up tanks?"

"The tanks were murdering the legitimate Syrian government."


"The US didn't even have a treaty with the Syrian opposition government!  You had no legal basis for this unprovoked attack."


"Okay.  We haven't heard any requests about stopping from the legitimate Syrian opposition government, but you have a point.  We'll stop the attacks right away, although it will probably take a few days for the order to move through the Pentagon."

"Al Qaeda and the Iranians are going to move in there and take over.  The US can't trust the terrorists and foreign insurgents to 'play nice' with the US after they take power."

"We don't think so.  We're willing to take the risk.  It's not likely that the new Syrian government is going to be interested in keeping the same friends as the old one.  We expect to just help out a bit, then slip away and let things take their course."

"You're going to recklessly unleash chaos and instability throughout the region."

"If you haven't noticed, there is a tidal wave of chaos and instability in the region already.  We're determined to not be cynical.  Instead, we'll be optimistic.  We're trying to work on our control issues.  You have shown the world which side of things you favor with your VETO vote.  We're showing the world which side of things we favor. After this, everyone will pretty much know everything."

The drones make US involvement truly "casual."  The particular drones selected for the mission should be among the cheapest, simplest choices.  The devices were designed to be expendable, and Syrian SAMs will inevitably shoot down some.  There are no particular treaty obligations to be met.  The collateral damage will be very limited -- tanks sitting out in the open firing on a Syrian city are pretty much "low hanging fruit."

When the drone attacks suddenly cease and no invasion follows, the message to the Syrian people will be clear.  "Now it's your turn.  You're in charge."