MeanMesa doesn't usually "dig up old bones" from the back yard, but this outrageous story clearly deserves a little Short Current Essays treatment before the useless domestic media mysteriously just "lays it to rest." [WAIT! Is THAT Donald Trump's helicopter??!!]
You may have noted the category of this post: "reader."
There have been volumes of "reporting" -- most of it maudlin outrage -- about the events in Flint, but MeanMesa has selected a few articles considered to be illuminating enough to merit their inclusion in such a "reader." Quite beyond the more frequently encountered "clap trap," it is hoped that this particular collection may prove educational.
What the Governor has done is tantamount to murder -- murder most raw and chilling. Perhaps the sold out Republican toadies in the Michigan State government will pass a new law for "multiple assault and manslaughter" with a sentence more "convenient" for this mad man.
Making sense from the narrative...
GOP Governor Rick Snyder: I Didn't Know Anything About It
It Was Someone Else's Fault
It Wasn't Really That Bad
Michigan Just Had To Do It
There Was Simply No Other Choice
GOP Policy: Nothing's better than criminal austerity for punishing
wrong colored people to make them into better citizens.
[Do they have anything left that we can still sell?
We have to finance these tax cuts and economic development grants somehow.]
Now, now. Is MeanMesa "flying off the rail," here? All this might be a little harsh -- if it weren't for all the poisoned children, we might be able to just sigh and walk away from this.
Lead poisoning is neither a joke nor an innocent oversight. The medical symptoms of lead poisoning in Flint are already beginning to appear.
Throughout this reader try to remember that:
One possible policy for a Governor with such a collection of municipalities at the edge of economic collapse might be to actually do something to resurrect those failing economies.
One possible policy for a Governor with such a collection of municipalities at the edge of economic collapse might be to actually do something to resurrect those failing economies.
Now, on to the collection.
Decline and Fall:
Did Lead Poisoning Bring Down the Roman Empire?
Is heavy metal poisoning the reason we’re not all wearing togas?
[Excerpted. Read the entire article here History Buff]
 |
| Roman lead water pipe |
The claim
Rome’s greatest feat of engineering—its extensive water system, which brought high-quality water into cities for drinking, bathing, and cooking—was also its downfall. The lead Romans used for pipes leeched into the water supply, slowly poisoning the population and turning them into feeble, sterile maniacs.
The facts
The Romans did use lead for their water pipes, as well as cooking and drinking vessels and even makeup. Lead poisoning, which can be the result of frequent ingestion of even small amounts of lead, has symptoms that could certainly hamper the progress of a civilization, including increased risk of miscarriage, reduced sperm count, developmental delay in the children that manage to be born at all, violence, insanity, and general poor functioning. Not very helpful when you’re trying to conquer and rule the known world.
The history
In 1983, a book by geochemist Jerome Nriagu called Lead and Lead Poisoning in Antiquity laid out the basics of the theory. There was an immediate backlash from classicists, who pointed out that not all Roman pipes were made of lead—many were ceramic or stone. Scientists also jumped in to pick apart Nriagu’s theory, using skeletal evidence to show that Romans actually had less accumulated lead in their bones than modern Europeans. It’s also been argued that Roman drinking water was unlikely to have absorbed much lead even from lead pipes, due both to the speed at which the water traveled and the buildup of minerals inside the pipes, which would have created an insulating layer.
[Emphasis - MeanMesa]
The part of this quotation which is emphasized is almost a direct indictment of the causes of Flint's lead problem. The precise problem which led to the poisoning is described in the following FiveThirtyEight article.
FiveThirtyEight
What Went Wrong In Flint
PUBLIC HEALTH JAN 26, 2016
Because of those transgressions [improper sampling], the Flint River’s corrosive water ate through the protective film inside the city’s old pipes, allowing odorless, tasteless lead to leach into the water. They are also what has featured in most of the news coverage of Flint: important questions about which officials knew what, and when. Gov. Rick Snyder has said the failures here had nothing to do with the fact that Flint’s residents are largely poor and majority black, but that didn’t assuage many who feel this wouldn’t have happened in a wealthier, whiter city.
Also worthy of examination is how a wealth of other data and information, gathered by the city’s residents, was largely ignored. When the county declared a public health emergency on Oct. 1, 2015, it was not a revelation for many residents. They had been fighting for months to convince officials that something was wrong. Instead of heeding those reports, priority was given to the official data — data that was flawed and shortsighted. As a result, the percentage of children with elevated blood lead levels in Flint doubled.
[Emphasis - MeanMesa]
The Michigan "Emergency Manager" Law
That Wouldn't Die
The monster is perfect for this job.
We just need to tidy things up a bit.
 |
| We just need to convince the villagers to cooperate. [image] |
Governor Snyder launched into his "emergency manager" scheme under full steam. It was a new blend of austerity and autocracy which shocked even the billionaires who owned what went on at the Michigan Governor's mansion.
Unhappily for Rick, Michigan citizens were just not equipped to swallow a policy which was so painfully Draconian. In a state-wide referendum they nixed the Governor's "first effort."
However, mere moments after the ballots had been counted the strong willed Governor "adjusted" the original "emergency manager" plan and replaced it with a new one which contained a provision prohibiting any sort of a similar referendum from wrecking it again.
MichiganLive
Snyder signs replacement emergency manager law:
We 'heard, recognized and respected' will of voters
By Jonathan Oosting
December 27, 2012
LANSING, MI -- Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder today signed a replacement emergency manager law that he says improves upon the version that voters rejected less than two months ago.
Like its predecessor, Public Act 436 of 2012 allows the state to intervene in financially struggling municipalities and school districts.
But unlike Public Act 4 of 2011, the new law allows local officials to choose between four different forms of intervention: A consent agreement, chapter 9 bankruptcy, mediation or emergency manager.
"This legislation demonstrates that we clearly heard, recognized and respected the will of the voters," Snyder said in a statement announcing the signing. "It builds in local control and options while also ensuring the tools to protect communities and school districts' residents, students and taxpayers."
Michigan voters repealed the state's old emergency manager law by rejecting Proposal 1 on the November ballot. Critics said the "draconian" law went too far by allowing state-appointed emergency managers to usurp local control and break collective bargaining agreements.
The new law, which includes an appropriation making it immune to referendum, also allows emergency managers to break union contracts if negotiations fail, a controversial power typically reserved for municipal bankruptcy proceedings.
Read more
Flint Water Crisis - Detroit Free Press [This is a collection of various articles.]
Anger in Michigan Over Emergency Managers - NYTIMES
Just a Wee Bit About "Emergency Managers"
Even from the horse's mouth, it still stinks.
Many of MeanMesa's foreign visitors may still be laboring under too many of the "traditional presumptions" about American representative democracy to easily grasp the oligarchs' scheme for installing "emergency managers" by fiat in places which should have had, at least by the old democratic plan of things, elected officials running municipal affairs. This new model represents a modern version of the old "war lord" style autocracy where the "king" simply appointed whomever he wished as the unquestioned "boss" of this province or that town.
Now, it might occur to someone observing the events in Flint, Michigan, that the responsible person selected to become this "autocrat" might be uniquely talented or experienced in accomplishing whatever it was that the "king" wanted.
Of course, the alternate motives for making such "lucrative appointments" are manifold. It might be a means for the "king" to repay a "special favor" which had been performed for him in the past. It might also represent a technique by which the "king" could "extract" desirable assets -- assets, usually property or taxes, previously held by the recipients of this newly positioned, local autocrat -- from those to be "governed" by this appointee.
Well, that description of the process, while establishing the basic plan for these "modern emergency managers," is clearly "too medieval" to entirely describe Governor Snyder's scheme for so rashly installing his man as the arbitrarily empowered viceroy in charge of Flint. [The title "viceroy" was most recently used to describe Paul Bremer's appointed post in the looting of Iraq. Read more Paul Bremer in Iraq - NEWSWEEK]
So, to be as fair as possible, MeanMesa is including the following quoted material. This is the official "explanation" and "justification" for implementing Governor Snyder's emergency management policy for vulnerable municipalities -- such as Flint -- in his state of Michigan. It is included here as "back ground" reading for blog visitors unfamiliar with the scheme.
It is interesting to note the claim that this policy was not directed at the destruction of unions in the areas attacked by the Governor. The "caveat" noted in the explanation was that without the implementation of this act, the likelihood that union contracts would simply be vacated was even greater.
Labor contracts make up the bulk of local government expenses. Because emergency financial managers do not currently have power to adequately address these issues, long-term financial problems are not solved. This legislation does not eliminate collective bargaining:
Although an emergency manager may void contracts to prevent the local unit of government from going into bankruptcy, new agreements still could come through the collective bargaining process.
Of course when the results of the policy are viewed in hindsight, the labor contracts of union workers in the municipalities where the policy was ultimately imposed were simply vacated by "State fiat."
Some other specific claims about the "disposition" of elected officials contained in the Governor's explanation are also interesting. It turns out, again in hindsight, that the criteria to be used to establish "providing information or assistance" pretty much handed Governor Snyder a "loaded deck" to "remove local elected officials."
Thankfully, this didn't mean "sending them to the cord field," but it did mean abolishing almost all of the legal responsibilities for decision making from those "elected officials." If all of this removal of elected officials sounds shockingly anti-democratic and autocratic, good. That means that you're getting the idea.
State Treasurer Andy Dillon, who previously served as the Democrat Speaker of the House, is leading the administration’s effort to ensure emergency managers that may be necessary in the future are properly trained. Despite the misinformation being spread by the media and on the Internet, the legislation does not give the governor the ability to remove elected officials at will. Claims that it does are simply not true.
The legislation includes a series of triggers, one of which must occur before a review of a local unit’s finances is even conducted, such as failure by the local unit of government to pay creditors or make timely pension contributions.
Even if an emergency manager is put in place, local elected officials can only be removed from office if they refuse to provide information or assistance.
Here is the official explanation in its entirety.
Michigan State government explains
Governor Snyder's "Emergency Management" Program
[Visit the following site to see the original: michigan.gov/documents/snyder/EMF_Fact_Sheet]
Emergency Manager
Background:
Under Public Act 72 of 1990, the state is authorized to intervene in units of local government that
experience financial emergencies.
The House and Senate recently passed legislation that allows the state to intervene at an earlier stage.
The new law also expands the power of emergency managers in order to better equip them with the
tools needed to address a local unit’s financial emergency.
Some are spreading misinformation about the legislation and trying to use this issue to provoke the kind
of fighting seen in Wisconsin.
Half of all jobs lost in the entire United States over the past decade were lost in Michigan. Dozens of
local units of government are experiencing serious financial challenges. We are in a crisis.
Setting the record straight:
The Emergency Manager legislation is a proactive approach to preventing a local unit of government
from experiencing a financial emergency.
An Emergency Manager would be appointed only in the event of a municipal financial
emergency.
By allowing the state to intervene at an earlier stage, the need for an emergency manager can
be avoided.
Appointing an emergency manager would minimize the likelihood that a local unit of
government would be unable to provide basic services to its citizens.
State intervention on local unit financial emergencies is not new, nor is only supported by Republicans:
Michigan has had an emergency financial manager law on the books since 1988.
The original law was signed by Democrat governor James Blanchard.
An emergency financial manager has only been put in place a total of 10 times in more than 20
years. Emergency financial managers have been utilized by both Republican and Democrat
governors.
State Treasurer Andy Dillon, who previously served as the Democrat Speaker of the House, is
leading the administration’s effort to ensure emergency managers that may be necessary in the
future are properly trained.
Despite the misinformation being spread by the media and on the Internet, the legislation does not give
the governor the ability to remove elected officials at will. Claims that it does are simply not true.
The legislation includes a series of triggers, one of which must occur before a review of a local
unit’s finances is even conducted, such as failure by the local unit of government to pay
creditors or make timely pension contributions.
Even if an emergency manager is put in place, local elected officials can only be removed from
office if they refuse to provide information or assistance.
The governor already has – and has had – the ability to put an emergency financial manager in
place since 1988.
The governor already has – and has had – the ability to remove elected officials for failing to do
their duty or for corruption. This power was established in Michigan’s 1963 constitution.
Former Democrat Governor Jennifer Granholm used this power to conduct removal hearings for
Kwame Kilpatrick, the former Detroit mayor who stepped down from office and was then later
convicted of corruption.
An Emergency Manager can only be put in place if local elected officials fail to take the steps necessary
to prevent a financial emergency.
Emergency managers are accountable to both the governor and the Legislature, which in turn
are both accountable to voters.
The goal is to give emergency managers the tools they need to protect residents and address local
government financial emergencies.
Labor contracts make up the bulk of local government expenses. Because emergency financial
managers do not currently have power to adequately address these issues, long-term financial
problems are not solved.
This legislation does not eliminate collective bargaining:
Although an emergency manager may void contracts to prevent the local unit of government
from going into bankruptcy, new agreements still could come through the collective bargaining
process.
If the municipality was to enter bankruptcy, a judge would have sweeping powers to undo
contracts. Bankruptcy is a much bigger threat to collective bargaining.
The governor has repeatedly said he will work within the collective bargaining system.
For further reading:
Editorial: New state financial tools will help fix budgets, not bust unions (Detroit Free Press)
For too long, Michigan has had too few tools to keep school districts and cities from wallowing in
financial trouble.
The Tale Behind the GOP's Poison Water
Just Gets Better and Better
It's a good thing that votes cast by Flint residents don't actually matter.
Of course, now that thousands of Flint's children have been poisoned by the lead in the city's water, the razor sharp focus of the domestic media is becoming obsessed with the time line behind the disaster. When did the Governor know? What did he do once he "found out?" What is the exact "narrative" describing the Governor's awareness and responses?
SICKENING
01.24.16 7:00 PM ET
Exclusive: Gov. Rick Snyder’s Men
Originally Rejected Using Flint’s Toxic River
[Visit the original article here Jan 24 2016 The Daily Beast]
 |
| Michigan Governor Rick Snyder confronted with Flint tap water. Photo Illustration by The Daily Beast |
An emergency manager said no to using the river in 2012 after speaking to environmental regulators. An ex-Flint official said the governor’s office reversed that decision.
DETROIT — The emergency manager for Flint, Michigan, appointed by Gov. Rick Snyder in 2012, rejected using the city’s river as drinking water after consulting with the state’s environmental protection agency.
Snyder appointed Ed Kurtz to be Flint’s second emergency manager and Kurtz selected Jerry Ambrose to be the city’s chief financial officer. Both men were tasked by the Republican governor’s administration with restructuring the city’s government to save money after it was in danger of becoming insolvent. One cost-saving measure considered was to quit buying municipal water from Detroit.
In a civil deposition not reported until now, Ambrose testified under oath that emergency manager Kurtz considered a proposal to use the Flint River, discussed the option with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, and then rejected it.
In 2014, Ambrose was deposed in a civil lawsuit brought by retired Flint municipal workers against the state over severe cuts to their health care benefits. Attorney Alec Gibbs questioned Ambrose about the water decision (a year before Flint learned it was being poisoned).
“There was brief evaluation of whether the city would be better off to simply use the Flint River as its primary source of water over the long term,” Ambrose said. “That was determined not to be feasible.”
“Who determined it wasn’t feasible?” Gibbs asked.
“It was a collective decision of the emergency management team based on conversations with the MDEQ that indicated they would not be supportive of the use of the Flint River on a long-term basis as a primary source of water,” Ambrose answered.
“What was the reason they gave?” Gibbs asked.
“You’ll have to ask them,” Ambrose said.
How could the river that was rejected as Flint’s permanent water source in December 2012 suddenly become suitable for consumption a mere 16 months later?
And who actually made the disastrous choice to start using the previously rejected river as the city’s temporary water source?
Howard Croft, the former director of public works for Flint who resigned in November 2015, asserted more than four months ago in a videotaped interview with the ACLU of Michigan that the decision to use the dangerously corrosive river came directly from the Snyder administration.
In the interview, Croft said that the decision to use the river was a financial one, with a review that “went up through the state.”
And who actually made the disastrous choice to start using the previously rejected river as the city’s temporary water source?
Howard Croft, the former director of public works for Flint who resigned in November 2015, asserted more than four months ago in a videotaped interview with the ACLU of Michigan that the decision to use the dangerously corrosive river came directly from the Snyder administration.
In the interview, Croft said that the decision to use the river was a financial one, with a review that “went up through the state.”
“All the way to the governor’s office?” the ACLU of Michigan asked him.
“All the way to the governor’s office,” Croft replied.
When questioned about Croft’s accusation in October, Sara Wurfel, Snyder’s spokeswoman at the time, offered up the false claim that the governor could not have made the decision to use the river because the city had been kicked off of Detroit’s system.
“The Detroit Water and Sewer Department at the time, back last spring, said, ‘Hey, we’re gonna cut you off.’”
This is a lie.
In a letter obtained by the ACLU of Michigan (PDF), emergency manager Darnell Earley wrote to DWSD in March 2014:
“Thank you for the correspondence [...] which provides Flint with the option of continuing to purchase water from DWSD… The City of Flint has actively pursued using the Flint River as a temporary water source… There will be no need for Flint to continue purchasing water to serve its residents and businesses after April 17, 2014.”
Snyder did not mention this letter in the history of the Flint water crisis that he presented in his State of the State address last week:
“First, the crisis began in spring 2013, when the Flint City Council voted 7-1 to buy water from Karegondi Water Authority [to be supplied by Lake Huron]. Former Flint Mayor Walling supported the move, and the Emergency Manager approved the plan. DWSD provided notice of termination to be effective one year later and, on April 25, 2014, Flint began using water from the Flint River as its interim source.”
Detroit did terminate a 50-year contract but it also diligently tried to strike a new deal to keep selling Flint clean, safe water. Earley rejected all offers and then sent that “thanks but no thanks” letter to Detroit saying that the decision had been made to use the Flint River.
If the governor really wants to come clean he needs to start telling the whole truth, not just convenient pieces of it.
Snyder tried to convince the public and the press he was doing that when he released emails from 2014 and 2015 (PDF). (There was rich symbolic irony in the fact that the first missive posted from the cache is completely redacted, blacked out from start to finish.)
If there was anything at all revelatory in the emails released so far, it is Snyder’s attention to detail.
There is, for example, a June 2015 email he sent out after being looped in on a positive television report about Michigan State Police bike patrols making their debut in Flint.
“Good work,” wrote the governor in a message sent to his team. “Let me know how things are going in our cities. Hopefully, we won’t have significant summer issues.”
As the world now knows, a slow-building scandal involving the lead contamination of the city’s water supply first came to light the following month, when a leaked U.S. Environmental Protection Agency memo sounding the alarm saw the light of day.
What remains still in the dark is the exact role Michigan’s detail-oriented governor played in subjecting the people of Flint to the hazards of a polluted river doubling as their municipal water supply. We also need to be clear on what the governor’s office and other state officials knew about the dangers posed by that river before the decision to use it was made.
Snyder can help shed light on that by releasing all of his emails—from both his government account and any personal email accounts that he might have used to conduct state business—going back to at least as early as the start of 2012 when members of his own administration considered and rejected using Flint’s river.
Given his willingness to release two years’ worth of emails, turning over documents from another two years should be no problem for a governor committed to transparency.
Curt Guyette is an investigative reporter for the ACLU of Michigan.
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